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Abstract:  
Until 2010, the cycle of socio-environmental mobilization in Argentina against transnational 
mining that began in 2003 had influenced legislative power only at subnational levels. The 
enactment of the Glaciers Law in 2010 constituted the first time that socio-environmental 
mobilization successfully influenced legislative power at the federal level. This article 
makes a double contribution to the analysis of this type of conflict. In theoretical terms, 
through the notion of “sovereignties in conflict”, it problematizes the question of sovereign-
ty in relation to socio-environmental conflicts, a dimension currently absent in studies of this 
kind. In empirical terms, it carries out a study of the enactment of the Glaciers Law. The 
principal argument is that the greater influence of socio-environmental mobilization on fed-
eral legislative power was made possible by the higher degree of openness to various view-
points at this level, in contrast to that observed at subnational levels, and by the more suc-
cessful organization and articulation of socio-environmental mobilization in this broader 
context. Keywords: Argentina, sovereignties in conflict, socio-environmental mobilization, 
transnational mining, Glaciers Law. 
Resumen: Soberanías en conflicto: Movilización socioambiental y La Ley de Glaciares en 
Argentina 
Hasta 2010, el ciclo de movilización socioambiental en la Argentina contra la minería trans-
nacional que comenzó en 2003 había influenciado el poder legislativo a escala subnacional. 
Sin embargo, la sanción de la Ley de Glaciares en 2010 constituyó la primera vez que la 
movilización socioambiental logró condicionar el poder legislativo a escala federal. Este 
artículo realiza una doble contribución al análisis de este tipo de conflictos. En términos 
teóricos, a través de la noción de soberanías en conflicto, problematiza la cuestión de la 
soberanía en relación a los conflictos socioambientales, dimensión ausente hasta el presente 
en este tipo de estudios. En términos empíricos, realiza un estudio de la sanción de La Ley 
de Glaciares. El argumento principal sostiene que la influencia de la movilización socioam-
biental sobre el poder legislativo federal fue posible por el mayor grado de apertura que 
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presenta con respecto a otros poderes legislativos subnacionales y el mayor grado de organi-
zación y articulación de la movilización socioambiental. Palabras claves: Argentina, sobe-
ranías en conflicto, movilización socioambiental, minería transnacional, Ley de Glaciares.  
Introduction 
Since the emergence of socio-environmental mobilization against transnational 
mining developments in Argentina between 2002 and 2012, its legislative ef-
fects have principally remained at the scale of subnational sovereignty. In a 
context in which more than half of the twenty-four provinces are affected by 
conflicts of this kind, nine provincial legislatures have enacted laws banning 
open-pit mining (Svampa & Viale, 2014).1 In October 2010, a regulation was 
passed at the federal level regarding minimum standards for the preservation of 
glaciers and the periglacial environment (Law 26.639, hereafter the Glaciers 
Law), which bans, among other things, mining and hydrocarbon exploration 
and exploitation in glacial zones. 
 With the exceptions of Costa Rica, which established a moratorium on met-
alliferous mining, and El Salvador (Broad & Cavanagh, 2015), which recently 
prohibited it throughout its territory,2 the intensification of protests in other 
Latin American countries against the development of such extractive projects 
has not resulted in the enactment of legislation at the federal level. In the past 
decade a vast and rich literature has emerged, analysing, from different case 
studies, socio-environmental conflicts in relation to the continued development 
of extractive industries in the region. These publications help us to understand 
issues such as the processes of dispossession of indigenous and rural communi-
ties in the context of the emergence of a new development model (Arsel, Ho-
genboom, Pellegrini, 2016), the multiple socio-political impacts in the subsoil 
of such extractive activities (Bebbington & Bury, 2013), and the implications 
of community-level consultation processes on extractive projects (Walter & 
Urkidi, 2015). However, the analysis of enacted law regulating large-scale 
mining in response to socio-environmental mobilization has received scant 
attention (Broad & Cavanagh, 2015). Given this gap in the literature, and based 
on the concept of sovereignties in conflict, this paper asks: Under what condi-
tions can a law such as the Glaciers Law arise and succeed in being enacted?  
 Our conceptual proposition argues that the socio-environmental conflicts 
that emerged in the last decade in Latin America place the question of sover-
eignty at the centre of a debate in which the two principal dimensions of sover-
eignty are contested: power and territory. We maintain, as the main hypothesis, 
that the escalation of the social-environmental mobilization from a subnational 
scale of sovereignty to the federal scale, in the process of enacting the Glaciers 
Law, was made possible and conditioned by two main dimensions: a greater 
degree of political openness, and a more effective organization and articulation 
of the those involved in the socio-environmental mobilization. While the first 
aspect makes reference to different degrees of democratization at the federal 
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level and certain subnational levels in Argentina, the second highlights both 
feasibility issues of broad coalition formation among actors in the process and 
questions of availability of the resources (material, organizational, etc.) neces-
sary to influence the legislative process. The contribution of this article to the 
study of socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America is twofold. First, it 
provides, in theoretical terms, a new framework of interpretation based on the 
notion of sovereignties in conflict (Torunczyk, 2015); and secondly it offers, in 
empirical terms, a study of the enactment of the Glaciers Law in Argentina. 
 The disputes and divergent positions around the value of water place the 
discussion about glaciers in a position of relevance in socio-environmental 
conflicts. Glaciers are crucial components of mountain hydrological systems 
and act as strategic reserves of water given the periglacial environment usually 
found in zones surrounding glaciers, characterized by patches of frozen soil 
saturated with ice that act as water resource regulators (IANIGLIA ND). The 
cycle of the gradual replenishing and melting of glaciers is a critical element in 
the natural environment, especially in dry ecosystems where they ensure water 
provision in the driest months of the year (Taillant, 2012). This study uses a 
qualitative methodology in order to understand the phenomenon under exami-
nation. It is based on a thorough analysis that reconstructs the legislative de-
bates around the enactment of the Glaciers Law and a set of ten semi-structured 
personal interviews with key actors who participated in the process, carried out 
between March and August 2016. 
Mining in Argentina 
In just twenty years mining in Argentina was radically transformed. A lagging 
economic activity in the early 1990s, mining became a state policy and strate-
gic gamble by the middle of the year 2000. In terms of percentages, the indus-
try increased from 0.22 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 1993 
to near 4 per cent in 2011 (Secretary of Mining of the Nation, 2012). At the 
same time, while in some provinces investment in mining advanced, social 
protests against the activity led to regulations regarding mining restrictions. 
This section does not propose an exhaustive discussion of mining legislation, 
but aims to set forth and explain the principal reforms of the last decades. 
 From the first years of the 1990s, the Argentine state moved toward a set of 
regulations that established a new legal-political framework. This process of 
reforms had its correlative movement in the mining sector, in the enactment of 
the Mining Investment Regime, Law Nº. 24.196/93, which guarantees fiscal 
stability and tax exemptions for investors and limits provincial royalty charges 
to no more than 3 per cent of the mineral value (Moorí-Koenig, 2000; Svampa 
& Antonelli, 2009). Subsequently, the National Constitution reform of 1994 
(hereafter NC) granted constitutional status to the original dominion of the 
provinces over the natural resources existing in its territory. This aspect is cru-
cial to understanding environmental policies in Argentina, a federal republic 
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made up of twenty-three provinces and an autonomous capital city. Although 
historically provincial ownership of resources had been respected (what is not 
expressly delegated to the nation remains in the hands of the provinces – Arti-
cle 75 NC) Article 124 emphasized the role of the provinces in the exploitation 
of mining resources and in the collection of royalties as established by the in-
vestment regime. At the same time, however, the NC Reform, in order to guar-
antee a minimum of environmental protection at the federal level (Article 41), 
empowered Congress with the authority to create laws with respect to mini-
mum standards laws, allowing provinces to enact more protective environmen-
tal laws, but requiring them to respected the environmental standards set by 
federal legislation.3 
 The first open-pit metal mines were inaugurated in Catamarca in 1997 
(“Bajo La Alumbrera”) and the following year in Santa Cruz (“Cerro Vanguar-
dia”) in a context of harmony and optimism with respect to the potential of the 
undertaking. However, six years later the events of Esquel, Chubut had become 
a foundational factor in the social resistance against mega-mining (Svampa & 
Antonelli, 2009; Walter & Martinez-Alier, 2010; Torunczyk, 2016). In Esquel, 
the citizens stopped the installation of a gold mine by Meridian Gold through a 
municipal plebiscite. Furthermore, this rejection of the operation provided the 
impetus toward the enactment of a provincial law banned open-pit mining and 
the use of cyanide in mining (Law 5.001 – in April 2003), and the so-called 
“Esquel effect” (Svampa & Antonelli; Marín, 2009; Renauld, 2016) favoured 
the replication of social resistance in different Argentine provinces. 
 Despite this first setback, support for mining became state policy at the fed-
eral level. Following the political, economical and social crisis of 2001, and 
after a period of transition, Néstor Kirchner, with the Partido Justicialista (PJ)-
Frente para la Victoria (FPV) coalition, came to power (2003-2007) with only 
22 per cent of electoral support. The Kirchner government rapidly generated 
social support based on a progressive discourse and policies aimed at “econom-
ic redistribution”. The “Kirchnerista” experience was part of the cycle of post-
neoliberal governments of the previous decade in Latin America (Levistky & 
Roberts, 2012), questioning the socio-economic consequences of the neoliberal 
policies of the 1990s and maintaining the necessity of a more active State role 
in regulating natural resource exploitation, with the objective of channelling 
these funds into infrastructure and reducing poverty (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). 
However, this neo-extractivist model (Svampa & Viale, 2014), in Argentina as 
in other countries of the region, overlooked socio-environmental questions 
with respect to mining and left intact the legal framework governing the indus-
try inherited from the 1990s (Cisneros & Christel, 2014).  
Socio-environmental conflicts and sovereignties in conflict  
We support the hypothesis that the wave of socio-environmental conflicts that 
rejected the development of transnational mining in Argentina reframes the 
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concept of sovereignty in terms of its two principal dimensions: power and 
territory. We understand sovereignty as the political decision-making process 
on territory (Foucault, 2004). By “power” we make reference to who is the 
legitimate actor to decide with respect to the exploitation of natural resources 
while “territory” reflects the different languages of valuation in conflict (Mar-
tinez-Alier, 2004). 
 From the emergence of the first socio-environmental conflict in Esquel 
(Marín 2009; Svampa & Antonelli, 2009; Walter & Martinez-Alier, 2010; Re-
nauld, 2016), through the expansion of the movement to other provinces, and 
up to the enactment of the Glaciers Law, the concept of sovereignty underwent 
a fundamental mutation effected by a plurality of visions in contention. Ac-
cording to Article 124 (NC) the decision whether or not to move ahead with a 
given mining project falls to the highest authority at the subnational level. 
However, the actual exercise of subnational sovereignty over mining resources 
is subject to the established environmental norms and laws that regulate extrac-
tive activity at different levels, as well as the actions of transnational companies, 
socio-environmental movements, provincial legislatures, and federal powers. 
 Subnational sovereignty in matters of natural resources was put in question 
at the local, provincial, and federal levels. At the local level, the question as to 
who should decide about mining projects is not normally articulated explicitly 
by social movements in terms of sovereignty but, rather, with respect to no-
tions of consultative rights or self-determination. Insistence on the right to be 
consulted comes from local communities and peasants who claim the right to 
direct their own local development, framing their argument in the constitution-
al recognition of environmental rights and the mechanisms of semi-direct de-
mocracy. Meanwhile, the principle of self-determination is claimed by indige-
nous communities with reference to the protection of their identity and territory 
within the framework of ILO Convention No. 169 for Indigenous and Tribal 
Peoples. The consultation process, far from being homogeneous, as pointed out 
by Walter & Urkidi (2015), is characterized as a “hybrid institution that com-
bines formal and informal competences (i.e. regulations, management and 
communication) and different forms of power (e.g. legitimacy, networks, re-
sources, trust) of social movements and local governments” (Walter & Urkidi, 
2015, p. 12).  
 Viewed in terms of the concept of sovereignties in conflict, this exercise of 
local sovereignty points up the tension between legality and legitimacy. 
Recognition of the results of consultation by governing authorities is not auto-
matic, and in certain cases authorities can challenge the results judicially or by 
using force. With regard to the validity of non-binding consultation, whether it 
acquires the force of law may depend on the mobilization capacity of social 
movements that often have a rather ambivalent relationship with the legitimacy 
or legality of public consultations. 
 In the case of Argentina, the dispute over the exercise of local sovereignty 
is not homogeneous, but is conditioned by the subnational socio-political char-
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acteristics (Torunczyk, 2016). To date, four instances have been recorded in 
which local sovereignty has in turn conditioned the exercise of subnational 
sovereignty. Although in all cases social mobilization appeared as a common 
element, in the case of Esquel in Chubut (2003) the mobilization succeeded in 
preventing the mining project by a non-binding plebiscite that was in the end 
recognized by the provincial government. In the case of the Mapuche commu-
nity of Loncopué in Neuquén (2012), a public non-binding consultation took 
place that also obliged the halt of the project, despite the fact that the provincial 
government judicially challenged the constitutionality of the plebiscite. In the 
cases of Famatina and Chilecito in La Rioja (2007 and 2012), it was the direct 
action of the socio-environmental movements that forced a number of compa-
nies to desist from exploiting various mining sites. While in Neuquén and La 
Rioja the conflicts did not succeed in escalating the issue from the local to the 
provincial scale, the events of Esquel led the legislature of Chubut to enact a 
law regulating in part metalliferous mining activity, prohibiting exploitation 
but allowing exploration. As for subnational sovereignty, it has been limited to 
the provincial level, the product of laws passed between the years 2003 and 
2011, which prohibit metalliferous mining in nine provinces.4 And with respect 
to the federal scale, this has been conditioned by the enactment of the Law of 
Minimum Standards for the Protection of Glaciers and the Periglacial Envi-
ronment in 2010, which is the focus of the present article.  
Sovereignties in conflict: The dynamics between power and territory 
Power and territory constitute the main dimensions of analysis in studies that 
analyse socio-environmental conflicts related to mining. However, we consider 
that it is necessary to view these dimensions in relation to each other and to 
introduce into the debate the question of a reconfiguration of sovereignty. The 
notion of “sovereignties in conflict” proposes a theoretical approach that con-
tributes to this task and is based on two main fields in the social sciences: sub-
national politics and the sociology of globalization. 
 From the notion of “sovereignties in conflict” we underline three central 
ideas: 1) subnational sovereignty, especially in federal countries, is a key di-
mension in analyses of socio-environmental conflicts and it is necessary to ana-
lyse how these are reconfigured at that subnational level; 2) sovereignties in 
conflict include a multiplicity of economic, political, and social actors who 
express different conceptions of the relationship between power and territory 
that weave through sovereignty at different scales (subnational, federal, and 
global); and, 3) sovereignties in conflict can acquire three different dynamics: 
convergent, agonistic, and antagonistic. This proposed typology will enable us 
to account for the different dynamics that enter into socio-environmental con-
flicts according to the different power configurations at the sub-national level. 
 Discussion regarding subnational sovereignty is relevant both with respect 
to the sovereignty exercised over natural resources by the provinces and to the 
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various political science studies that problematize the heterogeneity of political 
regimes in federal Latin American countries (Hagopian, 1996; Cornelius et al., 
1999; Gibson, 2005, 2012; Durazo-Herrmann, 2010; Montero, 2010; Behrend, 
2011; Gervasoni, 2010; Giraudy, 2011). Studies on subnational politics allow 
us to elucidate the democratic or authoritarian characteristics of subnational 
political regimes (Behrend, 2011; Gervasoni, 2010; Giraudy, 2010; Cornelius 
et al., 1999; Gibson, 2012; Durazo-Herrmann, 2010). In addition, this literature 
has advanced our understanding of the causes behind different degrees of sub-
national democratization, as a result of the relationship established between the 
federal and subnational political regimes (Gibson, 2012; Giraudy, 2009; 
Gervasoni, 2010), or in consequence of its own internal political dynamics 
(Durazo-Herrmann, 2010; Behrend, 2011). Analysis of the characteristics of 
subnational political regimes is important for the characterization of state-
society relations, and we position ourselves alongside those who affirm that in 
Argentina there exist different degrees of subnational democracy (Gervasoni, 
2010; Behrend, 2011). Nevertheless, based on the notion of sovereignties in 
conflict, we underline that discussion strictly in terms of political regimes does 
not permit an understanding of the various subnational power dynamics at play 
with respect to territory. 
 The literature on subnational democratization has equated the notion of ter-
ritory with the mere idea of territorial representation. In so doing, it has paid 
little attention to the existence of conflicting perceptions of territory among 
subnational governments, socio-environmental movements, and indigenous 
peoples in relation to natural resource exploitation. The last point is key to our 
argument. The development of transnational mining is federally-driven state 
policy, but this federal endorsement cannot explain the difference in actual 
mining developments at the subnational scale, or the varying degrees of com-
pliance with the Glaciers Law. Sovereignty reconfiguration, in relation to 
transnational mining, is not a process that is transferred from the global to the 
national scale without political and social mediation within the territory of the 
nation-state. On the contrary, sovereignty gives structure to political reality in 
terms of power and territory, but its sense and scope are put into question in 
different ways by the actors in the conflict.  
 While the classical notion of sovereignty holds to the idea of the predomi-
nance of an absolute and supreme power in a territory (Hobbes, [1651] 1996), 
with the concept of sovereignties in conflict we adopt a plural and non-
hierarchical view of sovereignty (Bellamy, 2000). In Argentina, sovereignty 
over natural resources constitutes a conflictive process with respect to the legit-
imacy of each actor and also to the territory being disputed. Socio-
environmental conflict is situated in a specific territory at the subnational scale, 
but the rules of the game are not limited to that scale but also transcend to fed-
eral and international levels due to a variety of existing laws.5 The actors in-
volved establish, then, alliances at different levels with the aim of legitimizing 
their positions and conditioning the exercise of sovereignty at the subnational 
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scale. Our conception of sovereignty avoids falling into an essentialist reading 
as if it were definitively defined. From the sociology of globalization we un-
derstand that sovereignty is permeated by a dynamic of conflict in which the 
notions of power and territory are put into question (Sassen, 2009; Sassen, 
2014; Hardt & Negri, 2000). Although power and territory are two dimensions 
usually analysed separately, our position assumes that it is necessary to prob-
lematize this relationship given that socio-environmental conflicts reconfigure 
power and territory in different ways.  
 The concept of sovereignties in conflict makes clear the existence of a mul-
tiplicity of economic, political, and social actors that express different under-
standings of the relationship between power and territory across sovereignty at 
different levels (local, subnational, federal and global). The idea of sovereign-
ties in conflict shares some assumptions with political ecology studies that ana-
lyse socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America. Natural resource exploita-
tion entails unequal economic and environmental cost distributions among con-
tending actors that express different languages of valuation of the territory 
(Martínez-Alier, 2004).  
 Mining companies have an economic interest in the export of minerals. Po-
litical actors, whether subnational or federal, do not manifest a common, ho-
mogenous position on this, but exhibit a range of priorities from maximizing 
mining income to arriving at regulatory frameworks for extractive activity. For 
their part, the socio-environmental movements usually express an environmen-
tal or ontological reasoning with respect to territory that goes beyond the realm 
of political or economic concerns. One perspective of political ecology based 
in geography favours an analysis of mining conflicts at the local or territorial 
level, understanding them within the framework of governance (Bebbington, 
2007). Another theoretical framework understands such socio-environmental 
conflicts as the expression of different development models in dispute (Svam-
pa, 2011; Svampa & Viale, 2014) in which the plurality of actors involved (so-
cial, economic and political) and the multiscalarity6 operate as mechanisms 
favouring legislative influences and therefore result in disputes over provincial 
sovereignties.  
 Based on the analysis of sovereignties in conflict we propose a typology 
that allows us to identify three distinct dynamics established among the differ-
ent actors: convergent, agonistic and antagonistic. The idea of convergent sov-
ereignties refers to a process of convergence among the interests of subnational 
governments and companies that achieve to advance with mining exploitation 
development. The idea of converging conflicting sovereignties may seem con-
tradictory at first glance. However, it is explained by the ability of political and 
economic actors to neutralize or conceal the conflict by marginalizing the actions 
of socio-environmental movements. Thus, despite the existence of a localized 
conflict, socio-environmental movements do not successfully escalate the con-
flict, perhaps on account of their ineffectiveness, or on account of a lack of inter-
est manifested by the population regarding environmental issues. Such reasoning 
Lucas Christel & Daniel Torunczyk: Sovereignties in Conflict  |  55 
 
would explain several cases in Argentine provinces that do effectively exercise 
sovereignty over mining resources: Santa Cruz, San Juan, and Catamarca. 
 The concept of agonistic sovereignties implies the formation of a response 
movement at the subnational level that achieves the prevention of the devel-
opment of such extractive projects. The conflict takes place, in such cases, 
within a socio-political context in which violence and authoritarianism are less 
developed or are not systematically employed by the subnational power against 
militants of the socio-environmental movements. The agonistic idea envisages 
a more open or democratic political space in which conflict is shaped by the 
notion of adversary rather than enemy (Mouffe, 2005). This idea can be used to 
explain, for example, the cases of Chubut, Mendoza, and Córdoba. 
 In the so-called antagonist dynamic, socio-environmental militants who 
stand against mining development are considered by the state as enemies of 
economic progress, and in certain cases as terrorists. This type of conflict hap-
pens in a political context in which the rule of law is weak and the response of 
the state to the movement’s militants includes a variety of authoritarian re-
sponses: the criminalization of social protest, police repression, army interven-
tion, or even the assassination of demonstrators. We also do not consider the 
different dynamics of sovereignties in conflict to be mutually exclusive. For 
example in certain cases, such as that of Catamarca, it is possible to identify 
both convergent and antagonistic sovereignties. Table 1 summarizes the typol-
ogy of sovereignties in conflict proposed:  
Table 1: Typology of sovereignties in conflict proposed 
S
O
V
E
R
E
IG
N
TI
E
S
 IN
 C
O
N
FL
IC
T CONVERGENT 
SOVEREIGNTIES 
 
Convergence between the interests of subnational 
governments and mining companies. Development of 
mining exploitation. 
AGONISTIC 
SOVEREIGNTIES 
Formation of a response movement at a subnational 
level that succeeds in preventing mining development.  
ANTAGONISTIC 
SOVEREIGNTIES 
 
Socio-environmental militants against mining are 
considered by the state as enemies of economic 
progress and in certain cases as terrorists. 
Source: Developed by the authors 
The Glaciers Law 
The protection of glaciers is fundamental for the safeguard of water resources, 
the defence of the ecosystem of the Andes mountain range and, fundamentally, 
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to guarantee the subsistence of productive activities and human survival itself 
(Taillant, 2012). During the public discussion about glaciers in Argentina, wa-
ter and the importance of water resources were politicized (Bottaro & Sola Ál-
varez, 2016), and the reconfiguration of sovereignty with respect to federal and 
subnational powers was at the centre of the debate. The concept of sovereign-
ties in conflict offers a way to explain the different dynamics involved in sov-
ereignty in the case of the enactment of the Glaciers Law. The shift in scale of 
the socio-environmental conflict from the subnational to the federal level was a 
function of the existence, at the national scale, of an agonistic dynamic that 
provided a greater degree of political openness and the possibility of impact 
within the federal legislative arena, as well as a greater capacity for organiza-
tion and articulation of the socio-environmental movement. 
 We will therefore analyse the tensions that emerge with respect to these 
issues when there is a change of scale from subnational sovereignty to the fed-
eral scale. The analysis of the enactment of the law protecting glaciers and the 
periglacial environment shows that the movement to the federal scale does not 
necessarily imply, in concrete terms, a greater degree of compliance with envi-
ronmental law at the subnational level. This passage to the federal level is per-
vaded by a dynamic of open conflict between claims for economic develop-
ment versus environmental protection, and between different ways of under-
standing sovereignty over natural resources at different scales. 
 Previous to the enactment of the Glaciers Law (Law 26.639) there was an 
antecedent beset by great controversy. In October of 2007, the Chamber of 
Deputies approved a glacier protection measure based on the guidelines estab-
lished in the General Law on the Environment (hereafter LGA)7 by MP Marta 
Maffei (ARI). On 22 October 2008, and with broad support from the ruling 
party FPV, the bill was unanimously approved by Senate and became Law Nº. 
26.418 (hereafter Maffei Law). However, on 11 November, then President 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015) vetoed this environmental legisla-
tion regarding glaciers by means of Decree Nº. 1837/2008.  
 The official position argued that legislation such as the LGA and other en-
vironmental laws already existed at both the national and provincial levels. 
However, from the opposition it was put forward that the presidential decision 
was in consequence of pressures from the mining provinces, in particular from 
San Juan, with Governor José Luis Gioja (FPV) in the lead, and the Canadian 
mining company Barrick Gold. The government’s determination to veto the 
law was publicly known as the “Barrick veto”. In this regard, Deputy Bonasso 
(Diálogo por Buenos Aires) would later declare “What is in dispute is water, 
and I will reveal how the agreement was made with Senator Filmus in order 
that the Chamber, the media and the public know. They also have to know 
what dark machinations of the Barrick Gold lobby are behind all these post-
ponements, the veto, and this discussion” (Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 
2010: 30-31). 
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Between direct action and institutional action 
The enactment of the first Glaciers Law (Maffei Law) was a product of the 
lack of awareness of the ruling party legislators; it transpired in a context of 
relatively harmonious legislative negotiations and did not involve any process 
of wide mobilization of social actors. Following the presidential veto the sce-
nario was transformed, inaugurating a new era in public discussion of the min-
ing issue. The legislative process that ended with the enactment of the current 
Glaciers Law involved a “multiplicity of actors” committed to the restitution of 
glacier protection at the federal level and was characterized by an agonistic 
dynamic. The interaction between non-governmental, social, and legislative 
actors (intellectuals, environmental assemblies, environmental NGOs, legisla-
tors from both chambers) can be recognized in two central aspects: first, in the 
efforts to generate social support for the initiative, and secondly, in the mo-
mentum within the legislative debate itself and the inclusion of various speak-
ers in favour of the glacier standard.8 This discussion about the protection of 
glaciers made it possible to debate the mining issue at the federal level in Ar-
gentina, a topic which, until that moment, several environmental organizations 
had found blocked at the subnational level. The context of the dynamics of ag-
onistic sovereignties enabled the coalition of socio-environmental actors to 
condition the dynamics of convergent sovereignties that prevailed in several 
mining provinces. 
 After the presidential veto, the actions in favour of a new Glaciers Law 
multiplied and different social groups deployed three central strategies that, 
complementarily, continued to increase social pressure. In the first place, a 
strong operation of diffusion and denunciation of the different assemblies in 
several Argentine provinces came from a mainly local component. Secondly, 
the collection of more than 150,000 signatures in favour of a new sanction of 
the law counted among its membership more than a hundred social and envi-
ronmental organizations across the country and from abroad. Thirdly, open 
letters were sent to President Cristina Fernández de Kircher and to the National 
Deputies and Senators, notably including letters from Nobel Peace Prize win-
ner Adolfo Pérez Esquivel and one of formal cooperation for the purpose on 
the part of several environmental organizations.9 Toward this last effort, envi-
ronmental assemblies, mostly linked to local work, shared slogans and a central 
objective similar to those of environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and the 
Argentine Natural Resources Foundation (FARN), which favoured the collabo-
ration of these actors towards a shared goal. 
 Legislative channels took a new course when, in December 2008, Deputy 
Miguel Bonasso (Diálogo por Buenos Aires) presented a project identical to 
that of Deputy Maffei. However, the climax of the conflict came with the 
presentation, by Senator Filmus of the governing FPV party in September 
2009, of a new glacier protection bill. From that point onward there was a con-
frontation between the so-called “Filmus Law” and “Bonasso Law”, the de-
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fenders of the latter accusing the bill supported by the governing party of being 
highly permissive with respect to mining activity. In this context of high con-
troversy, the voices of a plurality of actors were incorporated into the legisla-
tive debate, particularly through the Commission on Environment and Sustain-
able Development of the Senate. In the final stages of the legislative process, 
various social, political and economic actors were invited to present their posi-
tions. Through September 2010, a broad coalition was formed including repre-
sentatives of environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace and FARN, renowned 
academics and researchers on environmental issues, human rights activists and 
representatives of the social and environmental movement. They supported the 
“Bonasso Law” and environmental protection measures in the aforementioned 
Senate commission. This collaboration between different actors resulted in a 
shared document10 (which was later expanded and became a book; see Macha-
do Aráoz et al., 2011), with the object of articulating the various positions 
against mega-mining and persuading senators of all parties to approve the law.  
 Finally, and in a climate of growing social and political tension, an agree-
ment between deputies Filmus and Bonasso made it possible to unify legisla-
tive action behind the Bonasso bill by modifying it to: include a new definition 
of the periglacial environment; push back the start date of the national invento-
ry of glaciers and periglacial environments; and permit the continuation of an-
thropogenic activities during the making of said inventory. Although these 
modifications were viewed as part of the political reality of partisan negotia-
tion, at the same time they raised criticism among environmentalists for result-
ing in a less protective measure than that proposed by Maffei. After an exten-
sive legislative session, which ended near 4:30 in the morning of Thursday, 30 
September 2010, the senators approved with thirty-five votes the Bill of the 
Glaciers Law11 (later referred to as the “Filmus-Bonasso Law”) over the origi-
nal project of the Senate that obtained thirty-three votes (Di Paola, Pedace, Vi-
lallonga, 2011). Faced with this approval, the government of Cristina Fernán-
dez de Kirchner had no choice but to recognize the law, given that according to 
the NC, the executive branch could not again veto the law.12 Despite this, it 
took more than six months to partially regulate the Glaciers Law (decree 
207/11), and articles for the national inventory of glaciers were left unregulated. 
 Returning our focus to analysis, we underline that the coordinated work 
carried out by citizen assemblies and organizations of civil society to defend 
their territories and reinstate the vetoed law was crucial for the approval of 
glacier legislation. Through the reconstruction of this legislative process and 
the analysis of excerpts from the debates we can see how several representa-
tives highlighted the role of such assemblies and other social organizations: 
Above all, the success had to do with this struggle. It would be too much to 
attribute it only to our strength. This had to do with the exertion of citizen 
assemblies and intellectuals, such as Pérez Esquivel, Norma Giarracca, and 
Maristella Svampa. Also with people who every morning find themselves 
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among those mountains and who do not wish them to be destroyed or to 
surrender their water. That we are discussing this initiative today has to do 
with the battle given by each and every one of the people in our country, 
(Fernanda Reyes, Coalición Cívica, CABA, Honorable Cámara de Diputa-
dos de la Nación, 2010. p. 53). 
We face a situation of extreme danger that puts at risk this extraordinary 
source of water that are the glaciers. We should pay homage to the citizens’ 
assemblies because they have created, from the provinces, for the first time 
in our country, an environmental conscience that previously did not exist. If 
we are discussing this law today it is because it has been propelled by these 
mobilizations, (F. Solanas, Proyecto Sur, CABA, Honorable Cámara de 
Diputados de la Nación, 2010, p. 64). 
Moreover, it seems very important to me to acknowledge what is being 
concretized today at the institutional level, because it represents the labour 
of much time, of many environmental organizations, of groups that have 
travelled throughout and across the country generating the kind of discus-
sion that today is crowned institutionally, recognizing the work of col-
leagues like Marta Maffei and Miguel Bonasso, (C. Lozano, Proyecto Sur, 
CABA, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación, 2010 p. 86). 
The affirmation of subnational sovereignty and the Glaciers Law 
Discussion around the Glaciers Law highlighted the tensions between subna-
tional sovereignties and national sovereignty with respect to who constitutes 
the legitimate authority to decide on the management of natural resources. The 
representatives of the mining provinces (San Juan, La Rioja, Santa Cruz, Cat-
amarca, among others) – in addition to providing explicit support for the 
Filmus bill – built a strong defence of mining activity based on the assertion of 
subnational sovereignty over natural resources as granted by the NC (Art. 124) 
and denunciation of the encroachment of national sovereignty into areas of 
subnational sovereignty: 
The Cordillera provinces have enormous possibility; surely we are among 
the ten or twelve nations of the world that have such huge mining potential. 
And now we cannot develop it. Because fundamentally this is what it 
means. We are punished from all sides. History has punished us. Now every-
thing is about mining. Can we not establish, as the Constitution says wisely, 
the minimum standards and let the provinces decide how to move forward? 
Now, under the pretext of the environment we also want to limit provincial 
powers that are in the Constitution. Natural resources belong to the provin-
ces, (Gov. Beder Herrera, La Rioja, Honorable Cámara de Senadores de la 
Nación, 2010, p. 8). 
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I will not support any bill that means an attack against the autonomies and 
powers of the provinces in the management of their natural resources, and 
impede their progress, (Dep. Veaute, Catamarca, UCR, Honorable Cámara 
de Diputados de la Nación, 2010, p. 89). 
Conversely, the defenders of Deputy Bonasso’s bill sustained their position on 
the basis of article 41 (NC), constructing an argumentative strategy that con-
sidered the defence of water as a human right, and the benefit of a healthy en-
vironment a constitutional right: 
We’re talking about the source of life: water. Only 3 per cent of the water 
that covers the planet is potable, and two-thirds of that comes from water 
from glaciers. The economic models that place mining projects and the 
search for profit above water and life have already got their eye on the 
mountain range of the Andes. (...) The mining provinces, covered by Article 
124 of the National Constitution, which establishes that natural resources 
are the primary domain of the provinces, believe that they can turn these lo-
cal regulations into a legal obstacle to the application of a new national law. 
Let us remember that the National Congress has authority over the laws of 
minimum standards for environmental protection. This authority was dele-
gated by the provinces through Article 41 of the National Constitution, 
(Dep. Solanas. CABA, Proyecto Sur, Honorable Cámara de Diputados de 
la Nación, 2010 p 37). 
So it is very important that the Nation steps up to protect the glaciers be-
cause they constitute a public patrimony. Glaciers are a public good of in-
terest to all Argentines, and not only to the provinces where they are locat-
ed, (Dep. Basteiro CABA, Nuevo encuentro, Honorable Cámara de Dipu-
tados de la Nación, 2010, p 64). 
In the moments prior to the definitive enactment of the Glaciers Law, the pres-
sure of prominent sectors to “provincialize” the issue and resolve conflicts un-
der the shelter of their own convergent sovereignties was made explicit in two 
ways. Firstly, the Declaración de las provincias cordilleranas: Afirmación de 
sus competencias en materia de Cuidado Ambiental (Declaration of the Cordil-
lera Provinces: Affirmation of their Jurisdiction over Environmental Welfare)13 
held that “the provincial governments of the Cordilleran Provinces are commit-
ted to the protection of the existing environment in each of their territories, 
federalism being as it is a political system of territorial jurisdiction distribution 
which allows for effective resolution of particular and verifiable environmental 
issues in the territories of each of these Provinces”; and secondly, by arguing in 
the parliamentary debate that the provinces already had specific regulations for 
the protection of glaciers and therefore it would not be necessary to pass a 
Glaciers Law at the federal level.14  
Lucas Christel & Daniel Torunczyk: Sovereignties in Conflict  |  61 
 
Conclusions 
The analysis of the process of the Glaciers Law enactment in Argentina based 
on a notion of sovereignties in conflict made clear the importance of incorpo-
rating a perspective that problematizes the transformations affecting the ques-
tion of sovereignty in relation to the exploitation of natural resources and so-
cio-environmental conflicts. The notion of sovereignties in conflict thus con-
tributes to the discussion of this problem by accounting for how the two main 
dimensions of sovereignty, power and territory undergo an important transfor-
mation that modifies its meaning and scope. We argue, therefore, that the vari-
ous contending conceptions around extractive projects do not only imply con-
flicting views on development (Svampa & Viale, 2014, Svampa, 2015) or terri-
tory (Martinez-Alier, 2004; Bebbington & Bury, 2013), but also on sovereignty. 
 In Argentina, although sovereignty rests on subnational powers, these are 
conditioned by different socio-political dynamics that we systematize from a 
typology of sovereignties in conflict: convergent, agonistic or antagonistic. In 
this sense, the cases of San Juan and Mendoza illustrate two opposing tenden-
cies noted in the subnational positions regarding mining and environmental 
protection. In the province of San Juan, a number of mining companies filed a 
series of injunctions before the provincial courts demanding the non-
application of the Glaciers Law in the territory of San Juan. Despite the fact 
that these strategies on the part of the mining companies had the support of the 
subnational government, which was always inclined to defend its sovereignty, 
in July of 2012, the National Supreme Court of Justice finally revoked the in-
junctive measures, giving directives for the national inventory of glaciers in all 
national territories. Additionally, the province of San Juan delegated the crea-
tion of the inventory of glaciers to two institutes dependent on the National 
University of San Juan (UNSJ); and although the national law indicates that the 
body responsible for the inventory is the Argentine Institute of Nivology, Glac-
iology and Environmental Science (IANIGLIA), this federal agency did not 
participate in the reports prepared by the UNJS (IANIGLIA SD). 
 Conversely, Mendoza played a fundamental role in the application of the 
national Glaciers Law. With the strong backing of IANIGLIA, which has its 
main centre of operations in this province, it became the first Argentine juris-
diction to complete its inventory. In June of 2014, it was reported that the prov-
ince counts 572.57 km2 of glaciers, distributed in 1,625 bodies of ice (De la Rosa, 
2014). More than five years after the enactment of the Glaciers Law, the na-
tional inventory ordered by law has not yet been finalized despite the fact that 
the rule established 180 days for this task. 
 Despite some progress, the impact of the standard on the modification of 
mining policies in Argentina has been limited. Even if the enactment of the 
Glaciers Law has been an effective example of the influence of socio-
environmental mobilization, the capacity for the discussion of environmental 
and mining policies at the level of national sovereignty was notably limited. 
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The discussion around glaciers acted as a sort of “short cut” to discuss the issue 
of mining at the national level. And although the “anti-mining” and “pro-
mining” positions confronted each other throughout the debate regarding this 
law, the deliberations developed there cannot even be considered a minor part 
of the deep, comprehensive and necessary debate about mining policy in Ar-
gentina that was systematically deferred by Congress.  
 In this sense, socio-environmental mobilization in Argentina has encoun-
tered recurrent limitations to open up discussions of mining at the federal level. 
Between 2005 and 2013, of the ten bills presented that sought to ban or prohib-
it the exploitation of open-pit mega-mining across all Argentine territory, seven 
of them remained without any positive result in the Lower House, and the re-
maining three were equally without success in the Senate. Despite comprising 
a plurality of actors and receiving the support of certain legislative sectors, 
mainly small parties, the socio-environmental movement finds a limit facing 
their demands. The pro-mining policy of the national government and the rul-
ing majority in both chambers, as well as the control of key positions in mining 
commissions by representatives from mining provinces impede the possibility 
for deep debates on the mining issue at the national level at this time.15 
 Conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources (mining, land grabbing, 
soy, unconventional hydrocarbons) or the creation of large dams have been 
accelerating in Latin America and at the global level. The analysis of sover-
eignties in conflict may be useful to explain and compare how the dimensions 
of power and territory assume new dynamics in the analysis of other kinds of 
socio-territorial conflicts. In empirical terms, it would be interesting to com-
pare the Argentine case with other cases in Latin America, such as Costa Rica 
and Nicaragua, which have enacted laws at the federal level prohibiting the 
exploitation of metalliferous mining and do not have an intermediate level of 
provincial authority which figures in federal countries. Moreover, as the essen-
tial point of sovereignties in conflict expresses the tension over who decides 
what over which territory, the future theoretical deepening of our analytical 
framework could have the potential to analyse a wide range of social, political, 
and cultural conflicts that cross local and regional realities. 
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Notes 
1. We refer to metalliferous mega-mining, which, unlike the exploitation of underground 
mines, requires the use of dynamite through long passages of mountain and hills – due 
to the low concentration and diffuse distribution of minerals – followed by the use of 
chemicals and large amounts of water to separate rock from metal (Moody, 2007; 
Rodríguez Pardo, 2009). 
2. El Salvador prohibits gold mining for the sake of environmental conservation 
https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/03/30/el-salvador-prohibe-la-mineria-de-oro-para-
conservar-el-medioambiente/. 
3. Currently ten laws of minimum standards are in force: General Environmental Law (Ley 
General del Ambiente, 2002), Hazardous Materials (Ley de Residuos Peligrosos, 1991), 
Integral Management of Industrial Waste (Ley de Gestión Integral de Residuos Indus-
triales, 2002), Management and Elimination of PCBs (Ley de Gestión y Eliminación del 
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PCB, 2002), Management of Water (Ley de Gestión del Agua, 2003), Free Access to 
Public Environmental Information (Ley de Régimen de Libre Acceso a la Información 
Pública Ambiental, 2004), Protection of Native Forests (Ley de Protección de Bosques 
Nativos, 2009), Control of Conflagration Activities (Ley de Manejo de Fuego, 2013), 
Glaciers Law (Ley de Protección de Glaciares, 2011), Wetlands Law (Ley de Humeda-
les, 2016). (Banco Mundial/World Bank, 2016). 
4. Chubut (April 2003); Río Negro (May 2005 – repealed December 2011); La Rioja (July 
2007 – repealed August 2008); Tucumán (July 2007); Mendoza (June 2007), La Pampa 
(July 2007), Córdoba (September 2008), San Luis (September 2008) and Tierra del Fue-
go (April 2011). The explanation of the enactment and repeal of such laws in Argentina 
will be the subject of a separate article. 
5. Until the enactment of the Glaciers Law, the National Constitution included protection 
of environmental rights (Art. 41) and indigenous rights (Art. 75). At the international 
level, Argentina ratified, in 2000, Convention 169 of the International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO), which establishes the right of consultation of indigenous communities re-
garding extractive projects in their territory.  
6. The concept of sovereignties in conflict involves the idea that multiscalarity is a central 
feature of socio-environmental conflicts (Svampa & Antonelli, 2009; Svampa & Viale, 
2014, p. 200). However, the actors at the various scales do not carry the same weight. 
Sovereignty over natural resources is ultimately exercised at the subnational level, but 
the notion of territory incorporates the various dynamics of involvement with the global 
economy, the local histories combined within it, and the different meanings constructed 
by social actors (Bebbington, 2007). 
7. The General Environmental Law (25.675/02), dictates the governing principles guiding 
environmental policies. The objectives of environmental policy are: to ensure the 
preservation, conservation, recovery and improvement of the quality of environmental 
resources; to promote improvement of the quality of life of present and future genera-
tions; and to prevent the harmful or dangerous effects on the environment generated by 
anthropic activity, in addition to facilitating the ecological, economic and social sustain-
ability of development. 
8. The roles of social and environmental coalitions during the legislative process were 
reconstructed by means of analysis of the stenographic transcripts of debates from more 
than ten legislative sessions (Senators and Deputies and Senate Committee on Environ-
ment and Sustainable Development meetings). The thematic axes of the analysis were 
“Invocation of Rights” (Apelación a Derechos); “Federalism” (Federalismo); “Water” 
(Agua); “Environment” (Ambiente); “Social Movements-NGOs” (Movimientos Sociales-
ONG); “Mining” (Minería); “Origin of the Project/Veto” (Origen del Proyecto/Veto); 
“Expert knowledge” (Conocimiento experto); “Periglacial area” (Área periglaciar). 
9. Carta a Diputados y Senadores sobre la Ley de Glaciares, the letter to deputies and 
senators regarding the Glaciers Law from Adolfo Péres Esquivel, 19 November, 2008. 
The complete letter is available at : http://alainet.org/active/27619&lang=es. The organi-
zations that sent the Carta de ONGs a la Presidenta Cristina Fernández con motivo del 
veto de la ley de Protección de Glaciares,a letter from the NGOs to President Cristina 
Fernández on the occasion of the veto of the Glaciers Law, were: Greenpeace, Funda-
ción Vida Silvestre Argentina, Conciencia Solidaria, Amigos de la Tierra, Taller Ecol-
ogista, CTERA, and Fundación ECOSUR. The complete letter is available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/argentina/es/noticias/carta-de-ongs-a-la-presidenta/.  
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10. We refer to the document Defendamos nuestra fábrica de agua: 10 razones para apoyar 
la Ley de protección de los Glaciares sancionada por la Cámara de Diputados, 
http://www.maristellasvampa.net/archivos/ddhh09.pdf. 
11. The law entrusts IANIGLA with the task of carrying out the national inventory of glaci-
ers “for their adequate protection, control and monitoring” (para su adecuada protec-
ción, control y monitoreo; Art. 3, Law 26.639). On the basis of this inventory, the law 
stipulates in Article 6 certain prohibitions in glacial zones, installation of industries or 
development of construction sites or industrial activities, construction of buildings or in-
frastructure, except those necessary for scientific research and risk prevention. In addi-
tion the same article prohibits, in both the glacial and periglacial zones: the release, dis-
persal or disposal of polluting substances or contaminating elements, chemical products 
or residues of any nature or volume, as well as exploration and mining and hydrocar-
bons. 
12. According to Article 83 of the National Constitution, if a bill vetoed by the executive is 
again treated and approved by both houses, it automatically becomes law and must be 
promulgated by the executive. In other words, it cannot be vetoed again by the presidency. 
13. Available at: 
 http://wp.cedha.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/glaciares-docs-ley-glaciares-
declaracion-gobernadores.doc  
14. Santa Cruz (Law 3123, 8 April, 2010), La Rioja (Law 8773, 8 July, 2010), Jujuy (Law 
5467, 8 July 2010), San Juan (Law 8144, 14 June 2010) and Salta (Law 7625, 3 August, 
2010). 
15. Currently, the president and the vice-president of the Mining Commission of the Cham-
ber of Deputies both belong to the province of San Juan. In the Senate the presidency 
was in the hands of a senator from Neuquen and the vice-presidency in the hands of a 
senator from San Juan. Also, between 2005 and 2011 the vice presidency was held by 
César Gioja (FPV), brother of the governor of San Juan.  
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